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I Introduction
There is growing interest among public servants, Indigenous
organisations, and scholars in Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand in the idea of shifting from dassical New Public
Management accountability models to models that reflect
mutual or reciprocal accountability as a means of delivering
more effective and responsive health care to Indigenous
communities. However, little progress has been made
with respect to developing and implementing workable
reciprocal accountability models. In this paper, we argue that
a consideration of Indigenous perspectives on reciprocity
and accountability is an essential, yet mainly overlooked,
component of the development of effective and appropriate
accountability models between Indigenous peoples and state-
based funders. Indeed, many Indigenous peoples have long
histories of engaging in reciprocity-based relationships with
each other and their environments. Drawing from Indigenous
knowledge in this regard offers novel insights that can inform
how models of reciprocity are constructed and understood.
More specifically, we argue that consideration of Indigenous
perspectives on treaties and treaty-making as a way to
interpret the substance of mutual roles and responsibilities
enables a shift to models of reciprocal accountability that
are based on the mutual building of long-term, trust-based
relationships, while also providing a frame that emphasises
the maintenance of the sovereignty of the entities that are
party to such relationships.
In what follows, we bring Indigenous knowledge and
experience to bear on understandings of reciprocal
accountability in health care delivery by bringing together two
general bodies of literature that have, until now, developed
along largely parallel paths-the literature addressing
the need for a reciprocal accountability framework for
service delivery and the literature that examines Canada's
fiduciary obligation to Indigenous peoples. We argue that
understanding accountabilities in terms of the fiduciary
obligations that arise from the fiduciary relationship between
Indigenous peoples and Canada offers unique insights
into the theory and practice of reciprocal accountability in
two key ways: (i) by providing clarity on the nature of the
entities involved in the accountability relationship- that is,
Indigenous peoples in Canada have a unique status vis- -vis
other Canadians given their Constitutionally protected status
as 'Aboriginal peoples' and the Constitutionally entrenched
protections for 'Aboriginal and treaty rights';1 and (ii) by
shedding light on the unique processes and mechanisms
of accountability that are implied by a federal fiduciary
obligation. As we demonstrate below, an examination of
the origins and content of the federal fiduciary obligation
to Indigenous peoples creates space for the indusion of
Indigenous 'treaty philosophy' and Indigenous perspectives
on reciprocity and appropriate relationships between
Indigenous peoples and state-based entities.
We begin in Section II by providing some background
on the ideal of reciprocal accountability in general and
its relevance to the delivery of primary health care to
Indigenous communities in particular. Section III offers a
general description of the dominant interpretations of what
is entailed by the concept of fiduciary obligations according
to non-Indigenous scholarship and jurisprudence. Having
laid the foundation for a general understanding of fiduciary
obligations, we proceed in Section IV by explaining, first,
what 'Aboriginal and treaty rights' are and how these
Constitutionally entrenched rights relate to Indigenous
health and, second, how the protection of these rights
should be considered a fiduciary obligation. This prepares
the way for the core argument in Section V where we draw
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the connections between fiduciary obligations, reciprocal
accountability, and Indigenous perspectives. Here we argue
that Indigenous perspectives provide key insights regarding
the importance of recognising Indigenous identities as distinct
from other Canadians and the ways in which the inclusion
of Indigenous 'treaty philosophy' can offer a more robust
and appropriate rendering of reciprocity and reciprocal
accountability. Finally, we condude in Section VI by briefly
identifying how this analysis might inform more effective
strategies regarding the delivery and accountability of
Indigenous health care systems. Thus, the analysis as a whole
provides normative and legal/constitutional justifications for
reciprocal accountability frameworks that are modelled on
Indigenous accounts of reciprocity: normative in the sense
that primary health care providers ought to maintain their
obligations to Indigenous peoples; and legal/constitutional in
the sense that the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal
and treaty rights is of core relevance to the question of how
these frameworks are constructed. Further, by considering
Indigenous perspectives on how these relationships ought to
function, we prepare the way for future practical modelling
and implementations that are relevant to contexts, not only
in Canada, but in Australia and New Zealand as well.
II Why Reciprocal Accountability?
Although the specific implementation strategies remain
vague, reciprocal accountability is emerging as the general
conceptual framework that is best suited to the challenge
of providing effective, indusive, and responsive primary
health care to Indigenous communities in Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand. In part, this is due to the recognition that
typical New Public Management approaches that rely on
dassical contracting frameworks often undermine the goals
of increasing Indigenous participation in primary health
care delivery and providing effective and responsive care to
these communities.2 This recognition has precipitated a shift
from classical to relational contractual arrangements (or some
combination of the two) between funders and providers.
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Classical contracts are generally short term and focused on
dearly defined outputs/deliverables which allows for closer
and more efficient monitoring of performance by the funder.
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Such contractual arrangements are favoured by a New Public
Management paradigm, because they allow funders more
control over the transactions and the ability to demonstrate
to their constituents a return on investment with respect to
the dollars spent and the outputs delivered. Further, this
approach entrenches a one-sided accountability regime
whereby providers must report to funders to demonstrate
that they are producing value (measured in specific outputs)
for the funders' dollars while the funders' obligations to
the broader goals of better health and care are obscured.
However, while dassical contractual arrangements and their
associated uni-directional accounting practices are broadly
implemented in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, they
also demonstrate marked failures with respect to providing
adequate care and improving health status.5 They also
bring high transaction costs, including the need for multiple
contracts offering a patchwork of services, unreliable
funding due to the need for constant contractual renewal,
poor definition of services, heavy administrative costs/
reporting burdens, lack of accountability to the members of
Indigenous communities, barriers to recruitment/retention of
staff, and poor health outcomes overall.6 In broader public
administration the limitations of dassical contracting, in
what has become a complex network of providers, funders
and regulators, are also broadly recognised.
7
Relational contracts, on the other hand, are generally longer
term and more flexible, allowing the primary health care
provider some room to adapt their performance to their
dients' needs over time. As the qualifier implies, relational
contracts rely less on strict adherence to stipulated
outputs and more on the parties' desire to maintain good
relationships and ability to build trust and monitor their own
performance.8 Of course, from the perspective of the funders,
the drawback is that more involvement is required from
senior managers to build these trust-based relationships.
In addition, it is more difficult, in a strict accounting sense,
to demonstrate that the funders are receiving an acceptable
return on investment given that the measurable 'outputs' are
less detailed and more difficult to itemise and monitor.9 From
the perspective of the primary health care provider, there is
also considerable risk involved, should it lose the contract,
given that significant portions of its budget may hinge on a
single, long-term relational agreement. 1 0
However, the flexibility of relational contracts also
contributes to stability by allowing providers the freedom
to reallocate funds to meet needs as they arise.1 In general,
relational contracts are well suited for primary health care
applications precisely because they offer a level of stability
and responsiveness that is not attainable through classical
arrangements. Moreover, Indigenous communities often
demand traditional forms of care that may fall outside the
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scope of dassical 'output' stipulations,12 and the providers
themselves are often embedded within the communities and
play a dual role of providing care and advocating for the
communities.13 For these reasons, relational contracting is
gaining recognition as especially well-suited to address the
challenges accompanying the goals of increasing Indigenous
participation in primary health care delivery and providing
effective and responsive care to their communities. 
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Of course, according to current practice, particular
contractual environments most often fall somewhere along
the continuum from dassical to relational with providers
deriving their operating budget from an array of funding
sources and contracts of different kinds.15 Nevertheless,
despite this variation in funding models and significant
interest in the benefits of relational contracting, there remains
a general commitment in practice to the uni-directional/
upward reporting accounting frameworks that typically
accompany dassical contracts.
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It is here that developing a reciprocal accountability
framework can aid in furthering the relational contracting
trend. Reciprocal accountability departs from the dassical
New Public Management accounting style 'to a more
sociological understanding of an accountability environment
within which a variety of actors move.' Through this lens,
'accountability is the activity of rendering an account within
a group and between groups o that the actors negotiate
their identity, obligations and commitments in relation
to each other, producing an environment of reciprocal
accountabilities.'17 Rather than a typical principal-agent
relationship as in dassical accounting frameworks, reciprocal
accountability is based on a non-hierarchical arrangement
that emphasises partnership and a 'reciprocal relationship
among partners, in which everyone is simultaneously both
an agent and a principal, holding each other accountable
for achieving the missions for which the partnership is
formed.'18 This approach is entirely consistent with the
new public governance framework, in which accountability
within networks of actors engaged in the delivery of services
is necessarily shared and thus necessarily has elements of
reciprocity.19 Contractual accountability is not absent, but
the intention is that contracts are more relational and the
governance of the contractual relationship is more flexible.
The relational nature of reciprocal accountability represents
a significant shift toward the relational contracting features
of developing shared goals, mutual trust, and accountability
for agreed upon outcomes rather than itemised outputs.
Indeed, while funders may acknowledge the benefits of
relational contracting with respect to attaining the desired
outcomes, the lack of an agreed-upon workable reciprocal
accountability framework remains a barrier to its broad
implementation. As a case in point, the most recent Report
of the Auditor General of Canada regarding 'Access to Health
Services for Remote First Nations Communities' restated
(as it has in numerous previous reports) that '[w]orkable
solutions are needed to improve accountability and ensure
that individuals in remote First Nations communities have
comparable access to health services.'20 In short, the concept
of reciprocal accountability appears to offer the general
contours of an accountability framework that is suited to
a more effective relational contracting paradigm, but more
is needed to transform a general conceptual intention into
workable policy.
While the above discussion speaks to the general need for
a reciprocal accountability framework in the development
of alternatives to dassical contracting, there is another
significant reason to consider moving forward with
reciprocal accountability, one that is largely absent from
the public administration literature. That is, the very
communities that are the recipients and providers of
care explicitly demand reciprocal accountability. In what
follows, I focus on Indigenous communities, providers, and
representatives in Canada.
There are two key justifications underlying Indigenous
peoples' calls for reciprocal accountability relationships
regarding the delivery of health care to their communities.
The first is much like those canvassed above. According to the
Native Women's Association of Canada ('NWAC'), the end
goal is healthy communities, and an accountability model
that is 'based on governments working in full partnership
with First Nations, M6tis and Inuit peoples of Canada' is the
required means.21 Similarly, the Assembly of First Nations
('AFN') has stated that 'combining efforts to lead toward
enhanced mutual accountability for the results of program
spending and support development toward increased First
Nations responsibility and control' is necessary in order to
bring general funding and service delivery up to the standards
enjoyed by members of the broader Canadian society.22 More
specifically, the AFN has proposed A First Nations Health
Reporting Framework ('FNHRF') as part of a 'transformative
plan to dose the gap in health outcomes between Canadian
People and Aboriginal Peoples.' Reciprocal accountability is
a core feature of this proposal:
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The FNHRF is being built on the concept of Reciprocal
Accountability, specifically recognising that there
exists a severe imbalance of power between First
Nations and the FPT [Federal Provincial, and
Territorial] governments. The FNHRF by way of taking
control over the measurement of the performance of
FPT governments in their success to meet their stated
objectives will enable First Nations to use evidence to
support future negotiations to ensure that First Nations
interests are identified as priorities.
2 3
Finally, the British Columbia's First Nations Health Authority
('FNHA') considers that having reciprocal accountability
with funding governments is essential to providing indusive
and responsive care to First Nations communities in British
Columbia.24 Indeed, the success of the FNHA is deemed to
depend upon '[e]stablishing the principles and processes of
reciprocal accountability for the success of this new health
governance arrangement.'
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These kinds of justifications for moving forward with a
reciprocal accountability framework are not new. However,
as the citations above indicate, the ideal of reciprocal
accountability is not only supported by an analysis of
the contractual environment, but is explicitly called for
by the Indigenous communities and providers that are
subject to these accountability models. While Indigenous
support does, in part, follow the logic that is prevalent in
the public administration literature-that is, that reciprocal
accountability is desirable, because it promises to produce
better outcomes-there is a second justification specific to,
and prevalent within, Indigenous perspectives that is largely
absent from the literature. That is, Indigenous peoples cite
reciprocal accountability as following from the recognition of
Indigenous sovereignty and the nation-to-nation relationship
between Indigenous peoples and Canada.
This feature speaks to the broader political context within
which primary health care delivery and accountability
frameworks are theorised and implemented. In Canada, the
ideal of a nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous
peoples and Canada that entails the recognition of prior
and existing Indigenous sovereignty has long provided
the foundations for a wealth of Indigenous legal theory
and constitutional and political theory and practice. Most
notably the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples ('RCAP')
recognises that the relationships between Indigenous peoples
and the Crown were not based on conquest or assimilation
into common citizenship. Rather, these relationships are
based on treaty-making between ations -practices that did
not (and do not) entail the ceding of sovereignty.26 Moreover,
since 1982, Canada's Constitution explicitly entrenches and
protects 'Aboriginal and treaty rights',27 thus recognising
the history of treaty-making between sovereign entities as
expressions of Indigenous nationhood and, where treaties do
not exist, an underlying sui generis Aboriginal right to self-
determination,28 and the maintenance of distinct Indigenous
legal/political orders.29 As such, Indigenous peoples' daims
for alternative accountability relationships with funding
governments are also sui generis in nature and should not
be situated on par with other groups of Canadian citizens.
A key distinction with regard to primary health care and
appropriate accountability regimes should be noted:
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada have constitutional rights
to health and health care that are not possessed by any
other individual or group of Canadians. ... Treatment of
Aboriginal Peoples as merely 'other peoples' ignores their
constitutional rights and creates inequality of service for
Aboriginal Peoples.
30
As previously mentioned, although this distinct constitutional
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown is
largely absent from the literature on accountability in health
care, Indigenous communities and representatives do, in fact,
explicitly demand that their historical/constitutional status
shape their relationships with their government funders.
Since the entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights
in Canada's Constitution in 1982, it has become common
practice for Indigenous health care providers to ensure
that the preambles to their funding agreements explicitly
acknowledge and do not interfere with Aboriginal and treaty
rights. With respect to reciprocal accountability specifically,
the AFN, for example, argues that reciprocal accountability
arrangements should modify existing funding regimes
such that '[p]ayments to First Nations governments are ...
more like intergovernmental transfers than typical grants
and contributions',31 and that '[t]he reinforcement of tribal
sovereignty should be the central thrust of public policy.'
32
Similarly, the FNHA lists seven key directives outlining the
standards for a new health governance relationship based on
reciprocal accountability. The sixth directive explicitly states
that any agreements must '[n]ot impact Aboriginal Title
and Rights or the treaty rights of First Nations ... [and] ...
[n]ot impact on the fiduciary duty of the Crown'. 33 Although
this kind of language is ubiquitous in funding agreements
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and policy statements, it has yet to be meaningfully
operationalised in accountability frameworks.
III Fiduciary Obligations
Despite the lack of implementation, the inclusion of
this unique constitutional status and fiduciary nature of
Indigenous-state relationships holds the potential to impact
significantly on how we conceive of legitimate accountability
frameworks. There are two key ways that an appreciation of
this broader political context can contribute to attempts to
implement reciprocal accountability. First, it makes a stronger
case for reciprocal accountability. While the literature to date
focuses largely on the practical benefits in terms of producing
better health outcomes, taking account of the constitutional/
historical context provides further justification- not only
in normative terms (federal/provincial/territorial funders
ought to meet their historical and constitutional obligations
to respect Aboriginal and treaty rights), but also in legal
terms (the entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights
in Canada's Constitution enables a legal option whereby
the fulfilment of fiduciary obligations may be enforceable
in Canadian courts). Second, introducing the concept of
fiduciary obligations enables the inclusion of historical and
cultural contexts that may serve to darify what a reciprocal
accountability framework entails and how it ought to function
in practice. In short, operationalising Aboriginal and treaty
rights and the associated fiduciary obligation within theories
of reciprocal accountability may both encourage its uptake
and darify its content. Nevertheless, more clarity is needed
to operationalise these concepts. How, for example, does a
constitutionally entrenched guarantee of Aboriginal and
treaty rights trigger a fiduciary obligation for health care?
And how might an understanding of this obligation enable
more appropriate and practical theories of accountability?
In recent decades, developments in Canadian scholarship
provides overwhelming support for the daim that federal
and provincial governments owe a fiduciary obligation to
ensure that the interests of Aboriginal peoples are taken into
account and are not undermined through federal/provincial
legislation/policy.3 4 However, if the concept of a fiduciary
obligation is to offer some guidance regarding appropriate
accountability relationships between Indigenous peoples
and Canadian governments, further examination of what the
obligation in general entails is required. This section begins,
first, by examining the sources and nature of the general
fiduciary obligation to Indigenous peoples as derived from
non-Indigenous scholarship and jurisprudence, thus laying
the groundwork for an examination of the relationship
to Aboriginal and treaty rights (Section IV) and enabling
an examination of unique Indigenous perspectives on
reciprocity and 'treaty philosophy' with respect to fiduciary
relationships (Section V).
The fiduciary law concept itself has its origins in pre-contact
British common law and the adjudication of domestic
disputes over the transfers of land. The general principle,
as applied by the Court of Chancery in the late fifteenth
century, was that if a person (beneficiary) transferred land
to a trustee, then the trustee was under the obligation to deal
with that trust in such a way as to ensure that the beneficiary's
interests were given top priority.35 As such, '[t]hese duties
included such rules and obligations as: the trustee must act
solely in the interests of the trust, he must avoid all conflict of
interest and he is not to profit from the position entrusted.'
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In the broadest of terms, then, the fiduciary obligation is seen
to apply as a matter of fairness stemming from a condition of
vulnerability stemming from the relationship of the parties.
The theory and practice of fiduciary obligations has developed
significantly since its emergence in fifteenth century England
and, while today it remains a notoriously disputed concept,
there are key features that remain entrenched. The general
dynamics of the relationships that generate a fiduciary
obligation, for example, are well-established:
A trustee owes a fiduciary obligation to his cestui qui trust,
an executor to the beneficiary or an estate, a solicitor to his
client, an agent o his principal, a director to his shareholders,
and so forth. ... Once a fiduciary relationship is established,
the general duty owed is to act in the best interests of the
beneficiary.
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While categories like those mentioned above- beneficiary,
agent, etc-represent the most common contexts where
fiduciary obligations are presumed to exist, current
scholarship and practice remains undear as to the scope
of relevant fiduciary relationships. However, through an
analysis of the history of jurisprudence regarding fiduciary
obligations, Reynolds identifies several key elements
summarised here as follows:
(i) the fiduciary has some measure of discretion or power
over the interests of the beneficiary
(ii) the fiduciary has the ability to unilaterally exercise
that power/discretion
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(iii) the beneficiary is particularly vulnerable to the
fiduciary holding the discretion/power
(iv) the fiduciary has taken on responsibility to look after
the beneficiary's interests
(v) the fiduciary obligation depends upon the
reasonable expectations of both parties regarding
respective interests and capacities and, therefore, is
fundamentally reliant on mutual trust.
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As this list of elements indicates, a fiduciary obligation does
not simply follow from entrenched asymmetrical power
relations. That is, the typical categories (principal/agent,
child/parent, etc) seem to imply that fiduciary relationships
are inherently asymmetrical- that wherever a power
disparity exists, a fiduciary obligation ought to follow.
But while 'vulnerability' and 'power/discretion' are key
elements that may support this assumption, the features
of 'responsibility', 'reasonable expectations', and 'mutual
trust' reveal that '[i]t is the nature of the relationship,
not the specific category of actor that gives rise to the
fiduciary duty.'39 Vulnerability is a feature of the fiduciary
relationship, but the effects of vulnerability may be quickly
attenuated if sanctions are available to the beneficiary to
ensure that its interests are given priority.
A key feature that may be considered a sanction in this
regard is the legally enforced 'duty to consult'. In recent
decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has underwritten
the duty to consult with Indigenous peoples whenever
federal actions/policies infringe upon Aboriginal rights.
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Key features of this duty, as outlined by the Supreme
Court, indude 'adequate' and 'meaningful' consultations
that 'substantially address' First Nations' concerns, the
Crown's responsibility to become fully informed of the First
Nations' perspectives on the matter at hand, the Crown's
responsibility to ensure that the affected group is fully
informed of the potential impact of the proposed legislation
or decision, and a commitment to consultation beyond the
signing of any agreement.41 As these examples indicate, the
duty to consult is fundamentally about establishing and
maintaining effective communication between the parties
involved in the fiduciary relationship. Doing so holds
the potential to reduce significantly the consequences of
vulnerability.
Moreover, in situations like these where one party assumes
responsibility for another, key features of the duty to
consult also speak to the importance of instituting relational
frameworks that reinforce a commitment to improved
communication and accommodation in the long term, thus
building trust and ensuring that mutual expectations are
reasonable. Nevertheless, the key point is that
[t]he vulnerability of beneficiaries that exists within any
given fiduciary relationship does not create the fiduciary
nature of a relationship but is an inevitable by-product
of such forms of interaction. ... [As such,] relations of
equal power-such as those between partners-may be as
fiduciary as the inherently unequal relationship between
parent and child.
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It may seem counterintuitive to generalise the feature of
mutual vulnerability to a context of Indigenous-Crown
relationships that are, by and large, characterised by state
domination and asymmetrical power relations. However, as
we explain in Section V below, understanding the specific
content of fiduciary obligations between Indigenous peoples
and the Crown relies on an understanding of the historical
context within which the relationship and the attendant
obligations emerged. This is a context that saw colonial
powers in a position of vulnerability vis-2-vis Indigenous
peoples, requiring alliances and treaties with Indigenous
nations for their very survival. Indeed, the recent history
of Indigenous peoples' resistance to state infringements
on Indigenous rights-whether through court challenges,
public demonstrations, protests, or blockades- directly
challenges the dominant assumption of state invulnerability
vis-2-vis Indigenous peoples.43 Thus, when considering the
fiduciary relationship between Indigenous peoples and the
Crown, it is important to note that this relationship reflects
the historical and ongoing relationship that has been
defined by varying levels of mutual vulnerability.
In summary, the generalised concept of a fiduciary
obligation is more complex than a simple obligation to
protect those who are vulnerable. Rather, it is an obligation
that arises within a relationship of responsibility and trust,
and may involve mutual vulnerability. Fiduciary obligations
pertain to those vulnerabilities that arise as a result of
entering into a fiduciary relationship. These vulnerabilities
are attenuated in two key ways-either through the threat
of sanction (when this avenue is not blocked by the presence
of power asymmetries) or through the development of
trust and reasonable expectations through various forms
of communication/relationship-building (whether power
disparities exist or not). Through this lens, fiduciary
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relationships can, and often do, work both ways-that is,
they are fundamentally 'rooted in notions of mutuality and
reciprocity.'
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IV Fiduciary Relationships and Aboriginal and
Treaty Rights
This is an important perspective to draw from when
shifting from an analysis of the general concept of fiduciary
relationships to considering the particular case of fiduciary
relationships between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.
Not only does it reveal that a fiduciary relationship may be
enforceable through sanction (eg, through Canadian courts),
but it also emphasises the building of relationships based
on mutual trust and reciprocity as important alternative
means to maintaining the fiduciary relationship. Further, it
is immediately apparent that hese foundational aspects of
fiduciary relationships resonate with the features of relational
contracting and reciprocal accountability mentioned above in
Section II. However, before examining how a consideration of
fiduciary obligations contributes to the theory and practice of
reciprocal accountability, it is necessary to draw the linkages
between fiduciary obligations in general and Indigenous
peoples and Indigenous health in particular.
The basic daim in this regard is that the Crown (federal
and provincial governments) have a fiduciary obligation to
respect/protect Aboriginal and treaty rights, induding the
right to health care. This is a significant daim that requires
some unpacking. We first draw on existing literature to
explain the general meaning of Aboriginal and treaty rights
and how the right to health is induded in this category
and then explain how the Crown is bound by a fiduciary
obligation to protect/respect Aboriginal and treaty Rights.
Aboriginal and treaty rights are bundles of rights that are
specific to Indigenous peoples (defined as Aboriginal peoples'
in the Canadian Constitution) living within the boundaries
of the Canadian state and are explicitly guaranteed by the
1982 Constitution Act which states: 'The existing aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognised and affirmed',45 and that the Canadian
Charter 'shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate
from any aboriginal treaty or other rights or freedoms that
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.'
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While the precise content of Aboriginal and treaty rights
remains a major point of contention, it is possible to outline
the general contours of what these rights represent. First, it
is important to note that although both sets of rights follow
from the fact that prior to colonisation, Indigenous peoples
existed on the land that is now daimed by Canada in robust
societies governed by their own legal political, and economic
orders -'Aboriginal rights' and 'treaty rights' refer to two
distinct categories. As explained in R v Badger:
There is no doubt that aboriginal and treaty rights differ in
both origin and structure. Aboriginal rights flow from the
customs and traditions of the native peoples. To paraphrase
the words of Judson J. in Calder, supra, at p. 328, they
embody the right of native people to continue living as their
forefathers lived. Treaty rights, on the other hand, are those
contained in official agreements between the Crown and the
native peoples. Treaties are analogous to contracts, albeit of
a very solemn and special, public nature.
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Put another way, while treaty rights derive their substance
and force from their origins as 'negotiated rights' that follow
from political negotiations between sovereign nations (ie,
the Crown and Indigenous peoples), 'Aboriginal rights
are inherent and do not depend upon Crown recognition
or affirmation, the Crown accepted them in their full form
when it assumed its position of power in Canada.'48 Thus,
the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty
rights should be seen as affirming Aboriginal rights for all
Indigenous peoples and treaty rights as a second category of
rights that apply to contexts where particular treaties were
negotiated. Both categories, however, should be understood
as recognising the fact that prior to colonisation, Indigenous
peoples lived as distinct nations governed by their own
societal orders -Aboriginal rights are an explicit recognition
of Indigenous nations' rights to continue to govern
themselves as they did before contact with Europeans, and
treaty rights rely on the recognition of negotiations between
self-governing nations.
How, then, does a right to health fit within the Aboriginal and
treaty rights framework? As one might expect, there are two
avenues through which Indigenous health can be understood
as a right that is guaranteed by the Constitution- as related
to Aboriginal rights (or traditional Indigenous societal
practices) and as negotiated treaty rights. As Yvonne Boyer
explains in her recent work MovingAboriginal Health Forward:
Discarding Canada's Legal Barriers, because Aboriginal rights
reference the traditional practices of Indigenous societies, it
is straightforward to observe that these practices also include
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the various ways in which Indigenous societies maintained
the health of their members, which, as historical accounts
show, were robust and effective prior to the imposition of
colonial control by the Crown. Because the imperatives
to maintain healthy societies 'are core underpinnings of
Aboriginal society ... they thus fulfil the requirements of the
common law tests that the courts have set out to prove an
Aboriginal right.'
49
Alternatively, many treaties negotiated between Indigenous
nations and the Crown include specific provisions regarding
the Crown's responsibilities to ensure the ongoing health
and wellbeing of Indigenous nations in exchange for the
Crown's access to Indigenous lands. Indeed, several of
the numbered treaties covering much of central Canada
explicitly refer to health, medicine, and medical care as
a responsibility taken on by the Crown, but one that did
not entail the relinquishment of jurisdiction by the signing
Indigenous nation.50 And while the specific entitlements
following from such treaties remain a point of contention,
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the key point here is that, in addition to its status as an
Aboriginal right, there are several cases for which it can be
argued that Indigenous health is also a treaty right, which is
also protected under the Canadian Constitution.
Thus, it is of the utmost importance to be dear on the
political context within which Indigenous health policy and
legislation are developed. Not only do Indigenous peoples
have the right to health on par with other Canadian citizens,
as Canadian citizens if they so choose, but, in addition, the
guarantee of Aboriginal and treaty rights provide two
additional layers of constitutionally entrenched protection of
Indigenous health-as a sui generis Aboriginal right for all
Indigenous peoples and as a treaty right where such treaties
exist. It is a dark irony indeed, that Indigenous peoples
have the legal right to these two additional protections
regarding the health of their peoples, yet suffer from health
conditions that are well below that of other Canadians.
However, taking an acknowledgment of the distinctiveness
of Aboriginal and treaty rights as a starting point may lead
to an acknowledgment that Indigenous health issues have
to be addressed from the vantage point of Aboriginal and
treaty rights, which affirm the holistic perspective of health
as a constitutional right, separate from the federal, territorial,
and provincial statutory regimes.
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There are two pivotal questions connecting Aboriginal and
treaty rights (induding health) and fiduciary obligations that
fundamentally impact the quest to conceive of legitimate
modes of accountability between Indigenous peoples
and the Canadian governments: (i) How is the protection
of Aboriginal and treaty rights considered a fiduciary
obligation? and (ii) How does the fiduciary frame, once
established as legitimate, contribute to the development of
practical accountability frameworks?
Once we understand the right to health as falling within
the category of Aboriginal and treaty rights that are
constitutionally guaranteed, the answer to (i) is relatively
straightforward and can be read directly from the key
features of the Canadian Constitution as a whole that
demonstrate how the Crown has assumed responsibility
for key Indigenous interests. The Royal Proclamation (1763),
for example, demonstrates how the Crown interposed
itself between Indigenous nations and European settlers,
protecting Indigenous lands from settler acquisition in
return for the maintenance of good economic/military
relationships.5 3 A century later, the Constitution Act (1867)
made this responsibility more explicit, unilaterally assuming
legislative authority over 'Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians.'54 The indusion of the Indian Act a decade later
in 1876 and, finally, the guarantee of Aboriginal and treaty
rights in the Constitution Act (1982) all come together to
demonstrate a robust responsibility for Indigenous wellbeing
assumed by the Crown. The suis generis fiduciary obligations
follow directly from this assumption of responsibility for
Indigenous wellbeing. Moreover, in 1984, the landmark
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v The
Queen marked the first instance in Canadian jurisprudential
history where it was recognised that the Crown owes legally
enforceable fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples in
Canada-a principle that was subsequently applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada to cases involving the infringement
of Aboriginal rights.
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V Fiduciary Obligations, Reciprocal
Accountability and Indigenous Treaty
Philosophy
Answering question (ii)-How does the fiduciary
frame, once established as legitimate, contribute to the
development of practical accountability frameworks?-is
more complex. In the space that remains, we demonstrate
that a consideration of fiduciary obligations can contribute
to discourses surrounding accountability in general-and
reciprocal accountability in particular-in at least two key
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ways, both relating to how fiduciary obligations are, or can
be, underwritten and, thus, given practicable force. Both
approaches build from the arguments already presented
above and follow from the idea that the vulnerabilities
emerge from the development of a fiduciary relationship can
be attenuated either through sanction or through the building
of trust and reasonable expectations. On the one hand, as
has been demonstrated, fiduciary obligations are legally
enforceable obligations. On the other hand, however, as
argued in Section III above, fiduciary obligations also emerge
from relationships of mutual vulnerability and reciprocity.
While both approaches are part of Canada's chequered
history with Indigenous peoples, and support the recognition
of fiduciary obligations, the first approach entrenches a
dassical, uni-directional accountability relationship, while
the second is more amenable to relational contracts and the
related calls for reciprocal accountability and offers a more
appropriate way forward. We begin, first, with a discussion
of fiduciary obligations as a legally enforceable right.
Understanding fiduciary obligations as a legally enforceable
right entails the ability to enforce compliance through
sanction and aligns well with the New Public Management
principal-agent model of uni-directional accountability.
This kind of basic accountability relationship is commonly
defined as
a relationship in which one party, the holder of accountability
(or principal), has the right to seek information about, to
investigate and to scrutinise the actions of another party,
the giver of accountability (or agent). In its fullest sense,
accountability also implies the right to impose remedies and
sanctions, though sometimes that function may belong to
some other party.
5 6
It is immediately apparent hat applying a legally enforceable
conception of fiduciary obligations with respect to Indigenous
health entails a radical reversal of the typical accountability
regimes that characterise many Indigenous primary health
care contractual environments. That is, funders make
discretionary allocations to Indigenous primary health
care providers as third-party contractors, thus constructing
the providers as agents, or 'accountability givers'. As such,
primary health care providers are required to fulfil generally
onerous reporting obligations to the funders (the principals, or
'accountability holders') in order to ensure that the funders
are receiving an acceptable value for their money and to
justify further funder expenditures. However, if funding
for Indigenous health is considered a constitutionally
guaranteed obligation rather than an investment, the direction
of the accountability pulls are reversed.
As we have already seen in the previous section, this
understanding of health care expenditure as an obligation
holds whether Indigenous health is understood as an
Aboriginal right or a treaty right. When viewed from the
perspective of Aboriginal rights, it is dear enough that the
colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the
Crown has resulted, in many cases, as a loss of Indigenous
peoples' capacity to provide adequate care to their
communities, thus ensuring their wellbeing. It follows, then,
that the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to restore what
has been taken away as a direct result of colonialism. With
respect to treaties, on the other hand, a thorough appreciation
of the history and nature of constitutionally protected treaty
rights adds a measure of force to this accountability reversal,
revealing that the obligation to respect Indigenous rights
to health follows from the terms of treaties that gave the
Crown access to Indigenous lands. From this perspective,
many Indigenous peoples suggest that they have 'prepaid
for services such as health and medical care',5 7 and thus
Indigenous peoples, as original funders, have a right to seek
a return on their investment. Moreover, the fact that fiduciary
obligations are enforceable in court dearly moves Indigenous
peoples from the position of an agent to a principal that can
'impose remedies and sanctions' via 'some other party',
namely, the courts.
Nevertheless, the theoretical coherence of this position does
little to advance the prospects for practical application.
Previous jurisprudence, for example, indicates that, although
the courts have recently recognised the existence of a
fiduciary duty, they are unlikely to put much effort toward
holding the Crown accountable, which suggests that the
Crown may be unlikely to honour its fiduciary obligations.
5 8
Moreover, pursuing litigation in order to prove the existence
of the obligation or to force the Crown's compliance is a
resource intensive undertaking, which puts Indigenous
peoples at a disadvantage relative to the Crown and so an
antagonistic attempt to impose sanctions through the courts
may be financially infeasible or impractical.5 9 On a more
theoretical level, this approach entrenches 'simple relations
of hierarchy' where the accountability flows are linear and
uni-directional.60 Thus, while there may be some space for
optimism regarding the fficacy of a sanction-based approach
to fiduciary obligations, focusing solely on the legal duty in
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this way is not likely to be the most optimal strategic move.
Further, it does little to address the core problem with typical
New Public Management-style accountability regimes
that fail to account for the complexity of accountability
relationships beyond the linear 'upward reporting' frame.
Finally, this also strains against the fundamental character
of reciprocal accountability which emphasises building
relationships based on trust and reciprocity.
A shift towards understanding fiduciary obligations as
emerging from relationships of mutual vulnerability and
reciprocity offers an important contribution to the goal of
developing workable frameworks of reciprocal accountability,
because it provides a frame that is theoretically consistent
with the demands of relational contracting and reciprocal
accountability and it enables an understanding of legitimate
accountability relationships that is commensurable with
many unique Indigenous worldviews. In the latter regard,
it is important to note that, although much of the literature
on fiduciary obligations relies on its Imperial pedigree, the
establishment of fiduciary relationships between the Crown
and Indigenous peoples was not characterised by any such
unilateral imposition of British law. That is, as the courts
and legal scholars alike have recognised, 'the basis of the
fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples is rooted in their historical relationship.'61 An
accurate rendering of the historical relationship is important
here, because, contrary to the current context of entrenched
hierarchy, Indigenous vulnerability, and state domination,
the historical relationship was characterised by mutual
vulnerability and reciprocity. Both sides had something to
gain from the alliances that were established through treaty-
making. As Slattery explains:
The Crown has a general fiduciary duty toward native people
to protect them in the enjoyment of their aboriginal rights
and in particular in the possession and use of their lands.
This general fiduciary duty has its origins in the Crown's
historical commitment to protect native peoples from the
inroads of British settlers, in return for a native undertaking to
renounce the use of force to defend themselves and to accept
instead the protection of the Crown as its subjects. In offering
its protection, the Crown was animated less by philanthropy
or moral sentiment than by the need to establish peaceful
relationships with peoples whose friendship was a source
of military and economic advantage, and whose enmity
was a threat to the security and prosperity of the colonies.
The sources of the general fiduciary duty do not lie, then,
in a paternalistic concern to protect a 'weaker' or 'primitive'
people, as has sometimes been suggested, but rather in the
necessity of persuading native peoples, at a time when they
still had considerable military capacities, that their rights
would be better protected by reliance on the Crown than by
self-help.
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Vulnerability (in this context mutual vulnerability) is a
product of a fiduciary relationship. The dynamics revealed
by Slattery's description- whereby entering into a fiduciary
relationship created vulnerabilities and obligations for both
parties-were pervasive across a robust history of early
Crown-Indigenous relations and are part of the historical
record as evidenced in formal agreements and recognitions
like the Treaty of Albany (1664), the Covenant Chain alliances
(1664 -late 18th Century), the Royal Proclamation (1763), and the
Treaty of Niagara (1764).63 These touchstones in Indigenous-
Crown relations are valuable because they enable a more
robust understanding of what this particular fiduciary
relationship entails and the particular fiduciary obligations
that follow. The interdependence of the parties involved is key,
and it is this interdependence that precipitated conditions of
mutual vulnerability and thus demanded that sustainable
relationships were based on mutual trust and reciprocity.
Beyond providing us with a model of reciprocity-based
relationship-building, this concept of fiduciary obligations
enables sensitivity to Indigenous perspectives on legitimate
accountability relationships. That is, a consideration of the
historical sources of fiduciary obligations in Indigenous-
Crown relations provides us with a picture of the nature
of fiduciary relationships before Indigenous peoples came
to be colonised and when Indigenous peoples' traditional
diplomatic practices that reflected their own world views
helped to shape the character of the fiduciary relationship.
Patricia Monture, for example, argues that the fiduciary
obligation is part of a fiduciary relationship that follows from
the practices and principles of treaty-making. By introducing
the idea of 'Treaty philosophy' as a way to interpret the
substance of the mutual roles and responsibilities implied by
a fiduciary relationship, Monture explains that Indigenous
peoples and settlers alike possess these kinds of rights and
responsibilities, but that the current context of colonial
domination has obscured this reciprocity-based foundation:
Newcomers also possess Treaty rights including the right to
land, to peace, to their forms of governance, to their economic
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and agricultural practices. Ironically, I suppose, the Treaty
rights of the newcomers are not visible as these rights are as
easily exercised as breathing. It is only First Nation citizens
who must diligently and regularly fight for the recognition
and exercise of their Treaty rights.
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Moreover, from this perspective, the core emphasis is on
the building of relationship rather than on the stipulated
'rights' that emerge. The value of the idea of a fiduciary
relationship, then, is found more in the general guidelines
for relationship building than in stipulated, legally
enforceable 'rights'. 65 The kinds of things that 'rights'
entail are better expressed as responsibilities or duties that
emerge through respectful relationship building. As such,
the Indigenous world view that Monture relies on here
'emphasises process as opposed to product.'66
In this sense, drawing from Indigenous perspectives
on treaties and treaty-making draws our attention to
how obligations arise and are underwritten through
relationship-building rather than through sanction.
Treaties, then, are much more than contracts that stipulate
rights and responsibilities, but are viewed as 'sacred
relationships between sovereign nations.'67 The sacred
character of these agreements is emphasised by the
common understanding that treaties transformed strangers
into family members in a literal-not figurative-way.
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However, it is not as simple as signing an agreement.
Treaties require a commitment to ongoing interaction
and ceremony as a means to nurturing the relationships
and to enable a sensitivity to the needs of each party
such that responsibilities could become apparent and the
relationship could be sustained for future generations.
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As a result, practices of treaty-making between sovereign
entities work to establish and maintain an 'ethical
community, that is, [a] community within which promises
are kept.'70 This general ideal of treaty-making as reflecting
the building and maintenance of relationships of mutual
trust, reciprocity, and respect is ubiquitous in Indigenous
scholarship on the topic.7 1 Indeed, understanding the
fiduciary obligation in terms that are compatible with
a classical accounting framework-that is, where a
'principal' has a legally enforceable right to demand
some accountability action from her 'agent'- introduces
adversarial relationships that are in tension with the core
tenets of treaty-making as well as relational contracting
and reciprocal accountability: 'Litigation under the rights
rubric guarantees an adversarial approach where First
Nations are pitted against the Crown, an approach that is
a fundamental violation of Treaty agreements.'
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It is also essential to attend to the foundational understanding
of treaty-making as establishing and maintaining
relationships of reciprocity between sovereign nations. With
respect to the relationship between Indigenous nations and
Canada, the Two Row Wampum Treaty, or Guswhenta,73 is
widely held to reflect the notions of equality and respect
for difference expressed in the ideal of a nation-to-nation
relationship between sovereign entities. A thorough
interpretation of all that the Guswhenta entails would be
complex and beyond the scope of the point articulated
here, however the commonly held principles underlying
the nation-to-nation relationship are well established in the
related literature. There are two key features of the wampum
belt to which scholars often refer: First, two rows of purple
beads represent two vessels (Haudenosaunee and the
Dutch, English, French, or Americans) travelling the same
river yet along parallel paths that never cross indicates that
the Haudenosaunee and the settlers will coexist, but will
never interfere each other's ability to maintain their own
languages, laws, religious/cultural practices, and systems of
governance. Second, these two purple rows are separated by
(or linked by) three rows of white beads that represent peace,
friendship, and respect as foundations for maintaining the
autonomous coexistence represented by the two rows of
purple beads.74 Taken together, these two key features offer
a relational framework for how sovereign entities might
maintain their respective sovereignties while building
relationships of reciprocity without resorting to sanctions to
enforce their mutual obligations.
Thus, consideration of Indigenous perspectives on treaties
and treaty-making as a way to interpret the substance of the
mutual roles and responsibilities implied by the fiduciary
relationship, enables a shift from adversarial, rights-based
models to models based on the mutual building of long-
term, trust-based relationships while also providing a frame
that emphasises the maintenance of the sovereignty of the
entities that are part of the fiduciary relationship.
In summmary, recognising the fiduciary relationship between
Indigenous peoples and the Crown has the potential to impact
how we understand the nature of relational contracting and
reciprocal accountability between Indigenous organisations
and federal/provincial funders. Recall that reciprocal
accountability entails 'a more sociological understanding
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of an accountability environment within which a variety of
actors move' and envisions accountability as 'the activity of
rendering an account within a group and between groups
so that the actors negotiate their identity, obligations
and commitments in relation to each other, producing
an environment of reciprocal accountabilities.'75 As
such, reciprocal accountability reflects a non-hierarchical
arrangement hat emphasises partnership and a 'reciprocal
relationship among partners, in which everyone is
simultaneously both an agent and a principal, holding each
other accountable for achieving the missions for which the
partnership is formed.'76 In this sense, a consideration of
fiduciary obligations reinforces some of the key insights
from the literature on reciprocal accountability that
identifies the need for a more equal and reciprocity-based
kind of relationship that escapes the entrenched principal-
agent hierarchies.
However, the substance of the fiduciary relationship
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown is not simply
a re-stating of the key tenets of reciprocal accountability.
Indeed, as argued above, it offers a unique contribution
to understanding reciprocal accountability frameworks
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. First, it offers
a unique insight into the foundational question, 'Who is
accountable to whom?' It is here that considering fiduciary
obligations can build upon the advances already made
with respect to theorising reciprocal accountability. As
the selection by Sullivan quoted above notes, reciprocal
accountability reflects a context where 'actors negotiate
their identity, obligations and commitments in relation
to each other'. However, as we have seen, Indigenous
peoples come to the table with identities as sovereign
nations holding Aboriginal and treaty rights, and are thus
distinct from other Canadians. It is essential to attend to
this largely unacknowledged and non-negotiable identity
if legitimate and workable accountability frameworks are
to be constructed. As we have also seen, if we espouse the
legally enforceable notion of fiduciary obligations, this
may simply invert our answers to 'who is accountable to
whom?' if it leads us to reverse the accountability arrows
and essentially leave the basic structure of the model
intact. However, Indigenous identities and Aboriginal and
treaty rights bring with them a commitment to building
relationships of mutual respect and reciprocity. Thus, we
have a more complex answer that not only acknowledges
complex, reciprocity-based, and mutual relationships (as
in existing reciprocal accountability frameworks), but that
also acknowledges the centrality of Aboriginal and treaty
rights and the unique identity of Indigenous nations.
This unique identity brings to light another feature that
is not yet adequately addressed in existing literature on
reciprocal accountability and the provision of primary health
care to Indigenous communities. That is, while existing
accountability theory focuses on 'who is accountable to
whom for what', the question of how reciprocal accountability
relationships are developed and maintained is not dear. A
consideration of how presses us to consider both processes
and mechanisms for accountability that follow from fiduciary
obligations. In this regard, the mechanisms are what most
starkly distinguish the Crown-Indigenous accountability
environment from the typical Crown-citizen framework. The
constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights
indicates that accountability flows through the Constitution
rather than Parliament. To be sure, like other Canadians, those
Indigenous peoples who have accepted Canadian citizenship
can hold their elected officials to account through Parliament
in typical Westminster fashion. However, regardless of the
status of their Canadian citizenship, Indigenous peoples
in Canada also negotiate their relationships and relative
responsibilities through the constitutionally protected
practices of treaty-making.
Further, as we have seen with respect to the discussion of
fiduciary relationships in light of 'Treaty philosophy', this
mechanism already implies a process. And this process
entails more than simply leveraging a right to demand that
an agent give account-it is fundamentally about building
relationships based on reciprocity and trust. Thus, while
existing authors on reciprocal accountability are correct
to note that partners negotiate identities, obligations,
and commitments in relation to each other, the fiduciary
frame provides an alternative starting point for these
negotiations by acknowledging Indigenous nationhood and
Aboriginal and treaty rights and the alternative mechanisms
(constitutionally protected treaty-making between nations)
and processes (relationship building rather than imposition
of sanctions) that follow.
VI Conclusion
This paper has argued that a consideration of the fiduciary
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown
provides unique insights into the actual identities of
those who are presumed to be involved in reciprocal
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accountability relationships as well as emphasising
alternative mechanisms and processes for realising the
reciprocal accountability ideal. Further, although we have
not witnessed broad implementation of this ideal, attending
to the unique constitutional status of Aboriginal and treaty
rights along with the treaty-based foundations of reciprocal
accountability, holds the potential to encourage significant
mutual understanding and implementation in this area by
both darifying the concept of reciprocal accountability and
by providing normative and legal/constitutional arguments
in favour of implementation.
In addition, consideration of this perspective opens the
door to a number of possible ways forward that can impact
health care delivery, access and overall health outcomes for
Indigenous peoples. First, conceiving of primary health care
accountabilities in terms that are commensurate with the
Crown's fiduciary obligations may provide darity regarding
jurisdictions and catchment areas, such that 'jurisdiction
is based on the existing Aboriginal and treaty boundaries,
rather than on provincial and territorial boundaries.'
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Further, this way of defining jurisdiction and accountability
in terms of afederal duty would offer solutions to provincial/
territorial/federal jurisdictional haggling and support a
unified national policy that can provide a more robust
coverage for Indigenous Individuals and communities.
Second, a fiduciary frame reminds us that if we aim to
develop reciprocal accountability frameworks that are
effective, constitutionally legitimate, and that resonate with
the Indigenous communities that they are meant to serve, we
must emphasise the processes that underpin the development
of relationships of mutual respect and reciprocity. Thus,
an accountability model must not simply stipulate 'who is
accountable to whom and for what', but must indude forums
for dialogue and input within which such relationships can
be developed.
Finally, given the similar colonial and common law histories
of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, it is important to
examine the generalisability of this analysis to these contexts.
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, Australia and
New Zealand face similar challenges regarding the health
outcomes of Indigenous peoples and the imposition of
dassical contracting frameworks. In addition, the similarities
between the colonial, constitutional, and jurisprudential
histories of these countries suggest that there is good reason
to consider the application of fiduciary principles here as
well. Indeed, the examination of the Treaty of Waitangi by
New Zealand Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal have led to
an acknowledgement hat there is a fiduciary duty owed by
the government of New Zealand to the Maori people that is
similar to that established by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Guerin.78 Alternatively, in Mabo (No.2),79 the High Court
of Australia decided that Australian common law recognised
the existence of Aboriginal title. However, there remains
no consensus as to whether this decision would have
implications similar to those in Canada and New Zealand
by grounding a fiduciary obligation.80 Thus, the definition
and application of the concept is still under development.81
We are, therefore, in a unique position to contribute to the
understanding and application of fiduciary obligations
with respect to relationships between Indigenous peoples,
health care providers, and funding governments in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. Nevertheless, if the existence of
a fiduciary obligation can provide an effective constitutional,
legal, and relational foundation for appropriate reciprocal
accountability processes and mechanisms in these contexts
moving forward, it is centrally important that we are guided
by Indigenous perspectives on how to properly conceive
relational frameworks that have such profound impacts on
Indigenous wellbeing.
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